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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN OUTDATED DOCTRINE
FACES DEMISE IN A CHANGING JUDICIAL ARENA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sovereign immunity is a judicial doctrine which precludes a
plaintiff from holding a state liable for tortious conduct committed
by state agencies unless the state expressly consents to suit.' The
proclaimed basis for sovereign immunity in North Dakota rests in
article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution.2 Although
the doctrine has been challenged numerous times in the past,3 the
North Dakota Supreme Court has continuously held that the abrogation of sovereign immunity is a function vested solely within the
province of the legislature.4 However, with the recent election of
two new justices to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the former
majority vote could swing in favor of abolishing sovereign immunity and thus render North Dakota accountable for the tortious
actions of its agents.
The purpose of this Note is to illustrate that sovereign immunity, a doctrine which lacks historical accuracy, which has been
misapplied from its inception in America, and which has been
upheld on precedent alone should be abolished. This Note will
trace the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from its origin in feudal England to its present application in
North Dakota. Next, this Note will utilize the rules and standards
of constitutional interpretation to illustrate that the current application of sovereign immunity in North Dakota is untenable.
Finally, this Note will review changes which are likely to have an
effect on the longevity of sovereign immunity in North Dakota,
and conclude with recommendations for the abolition of this
doctrine.5
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1979); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396
(6th ed. 1990).
2. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 258-59 (N.D. 1990). The court has
consistently construed article I, section 9 as prohibiting suit against the State absent

legislative authorization for such suit. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional basis for
sovereign immunity in North Dakota see infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 84 and accompanying text for a list of cases in which the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has been challenged in North Dakota.
4. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 434 (N.D. 1991). See Senger v. Hulstrand
Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1982). For a discussion of the legislature's
authority to abolish sovereign immunity, see infra notes 123-26 & 132-34 and
accompanying text.
5. The abrogation of sovereign immunity should not, however, subject all levels and
functions of State government to liability for its actions. See Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224
N.W.2d 795, 804 (N.D. 1974) (stating that the acts and omissions of governmental entities
that are traditionally considered judicial or quasi-judicial or legislative or quasi-legislative
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND

The origin of sovereign immunity can be traced to 1215 A.D.
when King John first granted liberties to his subjects through the
Magna Charta.6 The Magna Charta provided that "[t]o none will

we sell, to none will we deny, or delay, right or justice."' 7 These
guarantees are a fundamental component of article I, section 9 of
the North Dakota Constitution-the article which is viewed as the

basis for North Dakota's sovereign immunity.8 Apparently article

I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the constitutional
article after which North Dakota article I, section 9 is modeled)9
attempted to paraphrase language in the Magna Charta. 10 How-

ever, the Magna Charta also granted to the king's subjects the
right to be restored of "lands, castles, liberties, or right[s]" which

had been taken without legal process, and further declared that
no concessions or liberties granted would be revoked or lessened.1 2 In addition, it guaranteed that, if any right or privilege

therein granted was revoked or lessened, such revocation would
be null and void, and that the "thing" obtained would never be
used.1 3 Thus, even under the Magna Charta, sovereign immunity
14
did not operate to completely bar claims against the king.
At early common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity

should remain immune from suit). See also KEETON ET AL., infra note 172, at 1046.
Governmental actions involving discretionary functions or policy decisions made by
executive-branch employees should be protected from suit. Id.
6. THE MAGNA CHARTA, reprinted in 13 N.D. CENT. CODE 1-9 (1981).
7. Id. at 5 (40th provision).
8. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 258-59 (N.D. 1990). See Dickinson Pub. Sch.
Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.2 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, J., concurring) (noting that
article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution stems from the Magna Charta and a
similar Pennsylvania constitutional provision).
9. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the similarity of
North Dakota Constitution article I, section 9 and Pennsylvania Constitution article I,
section 11.
10. KFGO Radio, Inc., v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 510 (N.D. 1980). The Magna Charta
contained a clause which stated "'Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut differemus rectum
veljustitiam," which is translated to mean "[wie neither sell nor deny, nor delay, to any
person, equity or justice." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1067 (6th ed. 1990). This translation
is paraphrased in the second clause of the first sentence of article I, section 9 (formerly
article I, section 22) of the North Dakota Constitution. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d at 510. For the
text of article I, section 9, see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
11. THE MAGNA CHARTA, reprintedin 13 N.D. CENT. CODE 6 (1981) (52nd provision).
12. Id. at 8 (62nd provision).
13. Id. The fact that the "thing" obtained would never be used seems to indicate that,
if a right or privilege were taken away from the king's subjects, then the revoked right or
privilege could not be used by the king to the detriment of his subjects. Id.
14. See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualified
immunity of the king.
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rarely denied relief for injuries inflicted by the crown and thus
immunity of the sovereign is not an accurate reflection of English
history. In the 13th century, ordinary writs were not enforceable
against the king and he could not be directly subjected to the law;
however, the king was required to do the same justice to his subjects as he required the subjects to do to each other.'" The king
was neither above the law nor obliged to defend in his own
court. 16 Rather, the king was expected to obey the law, and in

return the law gave the king a special position known as the king's
prerogative. 17 In the 16th century, the king's powers became the
state's powers and the king's prerogative became state sovereign
immunity.1

8

The realization that immunity was a contradiction of the
king's sovereignty dates back to ancient times when it was recognized that even though the sovereign could claim immunity, the
right to sue was the primary purpose behind the creation and
establishment of the king's courts. 19 It was admitted that the king,
who served as the fountain of equity and justice, would not refuse
to redress injuries when petitioned by his subjects because refusing redress would derogate from his honor.2 0 It seemed inconceiv-

able that what was equitable for a common person was not
equitable for the king. 2 ' In fact, the maxim rex non p6test peccare
or "the king can do no wrong" was always subject to the qualification that, for all of the king's acts, some minister was liable and not
15. 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 9-10 (1926). See also Smith v.
State, 473 P.2d 937, 941 (Idaho 1970).
16. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 515-18 (2d ed. 1968) (1895). "The king can do wrong; he can break the law; he is
below the law, though he is below no man and below no court of law." Id. at 515-16. The
authors further note that although the status of the king's court as the highest court arises
by accident, this "accident" allows the king to refuse to answer in his own court. Id. at 518.
17. Ludwik Ehrlich, ProceedingsAgainst The Crown (1216-1377), in OXFORD STUDIES
IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 56-57 (Sir Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921). This prerogative
provided for new royal privileges, but neither allowed the king's charter to be denied nor
allowed costs to be assessed against the king. Id. at 56-57. See also 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 512. Prerogative suggests that the king has the same rights as
others at common law, but that these rights are intensified when applied to the king. Id. at
512.
18. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 301 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. 1973) (Nix, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa.
1978).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 45A (1979).
20. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 8.
21. Biello, 301 A.2d at 853 (Nix, J., dissenting). Biello involved a wrongful death action
against a state agency. Id. at 850. In its opinion, the court discussed the history of sovereign
immunity, construed article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as mandating
sovereign immunity, and denied Biello's claim. Id. at 850-55. Article I, section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and North Dakota Constitution article I, section 9 are virtually
identical in wording. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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immune from suit. 2 2
Although the king could not be sued and thereby compelled
to answer in his own courts, there existed alternative methods of
obtaining reparations for wrongs inflicted in the king's name. A
subject who had been wronged could bring a petition of right
against the king 23 or the Court of Exchequer could invoke
its
2 41
King's Bench power and award relief to the injured subject. If
the subject chose the petition of right, the government would give
its permission by responding: "Let right be done."' 25 However,
the procedure which allowed a petition of right was never transferred to the United States.26 Rather, when the monarchy was
replaced by modern states, the erroneous justification for sovereign immunity, "that to allow a suit against a ruling government
without its consent was inconsistent with the very idea of supreme
executive power," was transferred to the states.2 7 This transferred
justification was erroneous because the individual states did not
recognize that the English courts had been established to provide
a method by which people injured by the king could obtain reparation for their injuries. 28 Therefore, the principle of "sovereign
immunity" should be construed against its meaning as understood
in America when it was adopted.2 9
B.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN EARLY AMERICA

History is unclear regarding which American governmental
entity was responsible for usurping the English doctrine of sovereign immunity to the United States. Neither the drafters of the
United States Constitution nor early colonial legislative assemblies
were responsible for the doctrine's development within
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A at 394 (1979).
23. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 8. If the king acceded to the petition of right,
the courts were then allowed to give the petitioner redress. Id. However, it was common
to encounter many procedural steps and infinite delays even if the writ was endorsed. Id.
24. Biello, 301 A.2d at 853.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A, at 394 (1979). "Let right be done" was
the English government's method of endorsing the petition and thus providing for a
resolution of the subject's claim in a proper court. Id.
26. Id. The individual states did not adopt the procedure of "'Let[ting] right be
done' " for injuries inflicted by the state. Id. Had individual states adopted that procedure,
it would then have been possible for people injured by state actions to obtain redress for
their injuries, and thus equity and justice would have been granted.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Jerome S. Sloan, Lessons in ConstitutionalInterpretation: Sovereign Immunity in
Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV. 209, 223 (1978). Professor Sloan offers "observations on
both history and charts, which ineluctably demonstrate that the lawyer-draftsman framers
of the 1790 [Pennsylvania] Constitution could not possibly have said that [the state] is
immune from all lawsuits without its consent." Id. at 211. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.2 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, J., concurring).
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America.3 ° Nonetheless, courts adopted sovereign immunity as a

common law doctrine following the Revolutionary War, based on
the premise that the fledgling government was not financially
secure
enough to allow claims of negligence to be brought against
it.3 '
Respublica v. Sparhawk32 was the first United States case in
which sovereign immunity was applied to bar recovery from a

state. Sparhawk, a Pennsylvania citizen, placed 323 barrels of
flour in a storage depot as mandated by the Pennsylvania board of
war.3 3 Sparhawk later brought suit to recover the price of 227 bar-

rels of flour which were lost when the depot fell into enemy
hands.34 In denying Sparhawk recovery, the Court noted that the
loss occurred flagrante bello 3 5 and concluded that many acts
which are lawful during war are not lawful during a time of

peace. 36 The Court opined that the removal of the flour was a
"natural and necessary incident" of war which was lawful and reasoned that this "taking" was necessary for the public good and
safety.
Thus, sovereign immunity began with a case which

would have differed in outcome if not for the war.
The first nonwar court to adopt sovereign immunity in the
United States was Mower v. Leicester.3" Mower brought suit

against an incorporated town for injuries caused to his horse while
traversing a defective bridge. 39 The court noted that the action
30. 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 438 (1958).

31. Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ind. 1972). Authorities point to the
English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), as being the stimulus for
early America's adoption of sovereign immunity. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d
795, 798 (N.D. 1974). Russell involved a claim against an unincorporated county for
damages caused to a wagon traversing a county bridge. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 359-60.
The court denied recovery on the ground that the county lacked a fund with which to pay
damages and because it feared that an infinity of actions would accompany a decision
holding the county liable. Id. at 362. See Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 798
(N.D. 1974).
32. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (1788).
33. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 357-58 (1788). The Pennsylvania
board of war was acting pursuant to a congressional resolution which directed that
measures be taken to prevent "provisions from falling into the hands of the enemy." Id. at
357.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 362. "Flagrante bello" is defined as "[d]uring an actual state of war."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (6th ed. 1990).
36. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 362. The Court recognized that seizure of the flour
without compensation could "only be justified under this distinction" and stated that it was
"better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience." Id. The "distinction"
recognized by the court was that the seizure of the flour had occurred during a state of war
rather than "in a time of peace." Id.
37. Id. at 363.
38. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Wis.
1962).
39. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 248 (1812).
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arose under common law and without the town's knowledge of the
defect, and stated that towns were not liable for the neglect of
their duties unless a statute provided for such liability. 40 The court
concluded by stating that "[t]he only action furnished by statute in
this case [was] for double damages after notice," and reasoned that
the lack of a fund with which to pay damages and the possible
infinity of actions which might accompany a decision holding the
town liable prevented Mower from recovering. 41 Thus, the early
American judges who employed and modified the doctrine of sovereign immunity confused the outcome of a judgment holding an
unincorporated county liable with the outcome of a judgment
holding an incorporatedcounty liable.42
C.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN NORTH DAKOTA

In order to clearly understand the application of sovereign
immunity in North Dakota, one must understand the differences
between governmental immunity and sovereign immunity.
Although there are numerous similarities between governmental
immunity and sovereign immunity, the North Dakota Supreme
Court recognizes a distinction between them.43 However, the two
terms are used interchangeably, and an argument advocating the
applicability of one immunity inevitably involves a discussion of
the other immunity.44 Sovereign immunity is the state's immunity
40. Id. at 250.
41. Id. The court stated that the reasoning in Russell v. Men of Devon with respect to
damages was conclusive against allowing the action commenced by Mower. Id. Russell v.
Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), involved a claim against an unincorporated
county for damages caused to a wagon traversing a county bridge. Id. at 359-60. The
Russell court denied recovery because the court could find no law or reason which
supported the action, because the county lacked a fund with which to pay damages since it
was unincorporated, and because of a fear of the resulting infinity of actions which might
accompany a decision holding the county liable. Id. at 362. However, the town of Leicester
was a "corporation created by statute, capable of suing and being sued." Mower, 9 Mass. at
249. Furthermore, the town was "bound by statute to keep the public highways in repair,"
and had "a treasury, out of which judgments recovered against [the town could] be
satisfied." Id.
42. See 3 DAvIs, supra note 30, at 438. See also Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359
P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961). "From the beginning there has been misstatement, confusion,
and retraction. At the earliest common law [common law England] the doctrine of
'sovereign immunity' did not produce the harsh results it does today." Id. The maxim that
"the King can do no wrong," meant "that the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled,
to do wrong; his acts, if against the law, were not legal acts, but iniuriae, [sic] wrongs."
EHRLICH, supra note 17, at 42. Thus, judges who treated sovereign immunity as barring
claims against the state did not understand that despite sovereign immunity, claims could
be brought against the King or ruling government.
43. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 800 (N.D. 1974).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 45A. In a section dealing with
governmental immunity, the author notes that what is "commonly called governmental
immunity" is sometimes referred to as "sovereign immunity." Id.; Leadbetter v. Rose, 467
N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1991). In Leadbetter, a party challenged sovereign immunity and the
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from suit, and governmental immunity is the immunity given to
political subdivisions such as counties, cities, park districts, school
districts, and townships.4" While sovereign immunity remains
valid in North Dakota, governmental immunity was abolished in
Kitto v. Minot Park Dist.46 Hereinafter, sovereign immunity will

refer to the immunity of the state.
The first case in Dakota Territory to consider governmental
liability in tort was Larson v. City of Grand Forks.47 Larson's leg
was broken when an awning which overhung a sidewalk fell upon
him.48 The court, in sustaining a 1,500 dollar verdict against the
City of Grand Forks, ruled that municipal corporations were liable
49
for injuries caused by a lack of care in the maintenance of streets.

The first North Dakota case to deny governmental liability in
tort was Vail v. Town of Amenia, in which Vail sued the town of
Amenia for personal injuries he sustained while crossing a public
bridge.5 1 The court denied relief to Vail and stated its concern
that a judgment for Vail would impose financial distress on a
sparsely populated town and thereby delay further development
and settlement.5 2
The current interpretation of sovereign immunity in North
Dakota began in Wirtz v. Nestos,5 3 a case in which the North

Dakota Supreme Court first offered a constitutional basis for the
application of this doctrine. 4 In Wirtz, depositors of insolvent
court discussed both governmental immunity and sovereign immunity. Id. Kitto v. Minot
Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). In Kitto, a party challenged governmental
immunity and the court discussed both sovereign immunity and governmental immunity.
Id.
45. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 800, 802.
46. Id. at 804; see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kitto.
47. 19 N.W. 414 (1884).
48. Larson v. City of Grand Forks, 19 N.W. 414, 415 (1884).
49. Id. at 416. The court stated that its holding was "inconformity with the act of this
territory, which provides that every person who suffers a detriment from the unlawful act
or omission of another may recover, from the person in fault, compensation therefor in
money, which is called damages." Id.
50. 59 N.W. 1092 (N.D. 1894).
51. Vail v. Town of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092, 1093 (N.D. 1894), overruled by Kitto v.
Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (ND. 1974). Vail was injured when the traction engine
he was operating fell through a bridge owned and maintained by the town of Amenia. Vail,
59 N.W. at 1093. It was established that the bridge had become rotten and dangerous and
that the condition of the bridge was known to the town months before the injury occurred.
Id.
52. Vail, 59 N.W. at 1095-96. The court stated that "[o]ne judgment against the town
in a case of the character and seriousness disclosed in the complaint in this case would
involve the town in financial distress from which it could not be extricated for years, and
would greatly retard its further settlement and progress." Id. at 1095.
53. 200 N.W. 524 (N.D. 1924).
54. Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524, 534 (N.D. 1924). See Schloesser v. Larson, 458
N.W.2d 257, 261 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting). "This perverse constitutional
interpretation did not begin until Wirtz v. Nestos ....- Id. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224
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banks brought a proceeding in equity against the Depositors Guar-

anty Fund Commission in an effort to compel the commission to
pay the insolvent banks' receivers an amount sufficient to reim-

burse the depositors.-' The North Dakota Supreme Court, in holding that the commission was not subject to suit absent the consent
of the State, quoted article I, section 22 of the North Dakota Con56
stitution in support of its holding.
Although the court based its holding on article I, section 22,
the court's reliance on this constitutional provision seems mis-

placed. This reliance is odd because the court first held that the
commission was not subject to suit absent the consent of the state

and then referred to article I, section 22 in an effort to ascertain
whether or not the constitution or general statutes provided
authority for maintaining this action. This is unusual because the
court had never before been given the opportunity to delineate a
basis for sovereign immunity. 8 Since this issue was one of first
impression, it would have been logical to first use article I, section
22 to provide a basis for the "sovereign immunity-consent
required" holding and then ascertain if there was a constitutional
or statutory basis for the suit. Since this was not done, there seems
to be no substantive basis for the court's holding that consent was
59
essential to the maintenance of a suit against the state.
The interpretation that the Wirtz court gave this section of
the North Dakota Constitution appears to be a mere afterthought

in an attempt to resolve the main issue facing the court.

°

The

court neither attempted to trace the history of article I, section
22,61 nor attempted to ascertain the intent behind the adoption of
N.W.2d 795, 799 (N.D. 1974). "The first reference to a constitutional basis for immunity suit
for governmental units was in 1924 .... ." Id.
55. Wirtz, 200 N.W. at 525-26.
56. Id. at 534.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first case in which
the North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with the issue of sovereign immunity.
59. For a discussion of the main issue facing the North Dakota Supreme Court in the
first case which dealt with the issue of sovereign immunity, see infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
60. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 261 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting).
See Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524 (N.D. 1924). The Wirtz court was attempting to establish
the priority of unsecured depositors in the proceeds of the guarantee fund. Id. at 526. At
the time of Wirtz, the guarantee fund contained about $400,000 and was faced with
$8,000,000 of claims by depositors of 80 insolvent banking institutions. Id. Thus, the main
issue in Wirtz was the priority of the depositors' claims on the guarantee fund and not
whether the state could be sued. Id.
61. Pursuant to North Dakota Century Code §46-03-11.1, the North Dakota
Constitution was renumbered as of the publishing of North Dakota Century Code volume
13 in 1981. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 46-03-11.1 (Supp. 1991). This renumbering was
undertaken in an effort to "correlate and integrate all constitutional provisions in a
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this section."2 In fact, the Wirtz court could not have intended
that its holding would become the basis and precedent for barring
63
recovery by people injured through the State's tortious conduct.
To avoid this result, the court specified that State agencies were
not above and beyond the law or the Constitution. 4 The court
further stated that citizen's rights to due process, "to the equal
protection of the law, and to the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the state and of the nation, [would] be
open to vindication, and their violation to redress against [a state
65
agency], no less than against any person, natural or artificial."
The Wirtz court concluded by stating that no rights of an injured
party were at risk; but, if these rights were endangered by a State

agency in the future, "no injured person [would] be denied the
redress or the remedies to which [they were] entitled under the
fundamental law of the land."'6 6 This statement indicates that the
court foresaw the need to allow recovery for tortious acts committed by the State, and that the court did not intend to establish sovereign immunity as a bar to such claims.
After Wirtz, article I, section 9 was not mentioned in a tort

action against North Dakota until the 1958 case of Spielman v.
State.67 The Spielman court refused to allow Spielman to recover
for injuries sustained when his vehicle was struck by a North
Dakota State Highway Department truck.6 8 The court deternumbering arrangement that avoids ambiguity and duplication and that aids in placing
constitutional amendments into the constitution." Id. As a result of this renumbering,
article I, section 22 was renumbered as article I, section 9 and is thus a part of the
Declaration of Rights provisions contained within the North Dakota Constitution. N.D.
CONST. art. I. Hereinafter, former North Dakota Constitution article I, section 22, will be
referred to as article I, section 9, even if this section is referred to in a time frame previous
to the 1981 renumbering. For the text of article I, section 9, see infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
62. Schloesser, 458 N.W.2d at 261. See generally Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524 (N.D.
1924). Although the Wirtz court quoted article I, section 22, it accepted the section on its
face and did not address the conflict which occurs between the two clauses contained
within the second sentence of that article. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
63. Wirtz, 200 N.W. at 535.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
68. Spielman v. State, 91 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (N.D. 1958). Spielman brought an action
against the State, the state highway department, and the highway department employee
who was operating the truck involved in the collision. Id. at 628. The court determined
that the State had not consented to suit and that the State and the state highway
department were therefore immune. Id. at 630. However, the court noted that
"governmental immunity does not protect an employee of the government from liability
for negligent acts" committed by the employee and thus allowed the suit to proceed against
the highway department employee. Id.
Contra Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 908 n.3 (N.D. 1988).
Today, the North Dakota Supreme Court treats a suit against a State official or against a
State employee for acts or omissions undertaken in the employee's official capacity as
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mined that although a statute existed which authorized the
purchase of liability insurance,6 9 the statute was merely permissive
and did not waive the sovereign immunity of the State. 0
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was asserted again in the
1971 case of Wright v. State,7 ' in which the court failed to find a
waiver of sovereign immunity even though liability insurance had
been purchased for the State. 2 The court acknowledged that the
State had an interest "in providing protection for its citizens who
suffer injury at the hands of negligent State employees, '7 3 but
stated that this objective could be accomplished "by the purchase
of liability insurance ... without the State surrendering its constitutionally protected immunity from suit."71 4 Therefore, the court

construed the purchase of insurance not as a waiver of the State's
sovereign immunity, but rather as the most flexible method of
assuring that
the government has "financially responsible
7 5
employees."

After Wright, the court did not refer to the sovereign immu76
nity of the State until 1974 in Kitto v. Minot Park District.
Although Kitto involved a challenge to governmental immunity,
its discussion is pertinent to any discussion of sovereign immunity
since the protective measures taken when governmental immunity was abolished could be applied in a similar fashion if sovereign
immunity were abolished. In Kitto, Mrs. Kitto brought suit against
equivalent to a suit against North Dakota. Id.; Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 72
(N.D. 1983). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(2) (Supp. 1991). A State employee may not
"be held liable in the employee's personal capacity for actions or omissions occurring within
the scope of the employee's employment unless such actions or omissions constitute
reckless or grossly negligent conduct, malfeasance, or willful or wanton misconduct." Id.
69. Spielman, 91 N.W.2d at 629.
70. Id. at 630. The court noted that it was clear "that the legislature did not intend by
the mere enactment of the statute to waive in toto the state's immunity from liability
resulting from injuries against which insurance might have been taken." Id.
71. 189 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1971).
72. Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675, 679-80 (N.D. 1971). Wright brought an action
against the State and the State Highway Department for injuries sustained in a collision
with a North Dakota highway department vehicle. Id. at 676.
Cf N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-05 and 32-12.1-15(1) (Supp. 1991). A State agency
may insure "for its own protection or for the protection of any state employee." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(1) (Supp. 1991). However, the purchase of insurance may not "be
construed as a waiver of any existing immunity to suit." Id. Furthermore, an "insurer may
not assert the defense of governmental immunity," and the insurer may not be sued
directly by the claimant. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-05 (Supp. 1991). Since North Dakota
has provided for insurance, and in some instances actually obtained insurance coverage,
there does not appear to be a valid reason for not allowing the State of North Dakota or its
employees to be sued and held liable under circumstances in which a private tortfeasor
would be liable.
73. Wright, 189 N.W.2d at 679.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 679-80.
76. 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
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the Minot Park District for the death of her son, who died as a
result of his near-drowning in a park duck pond.77 The court overruled previous decisions to the contrary and held "that governmental bodies, other than the state government, are subject to suit
for damages to individuals injured by the negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions of their agents and employees."7 ' The holding of
the Kitto court was a landmark decision because, for the first time
since 1894, a North Dakota governmental agency was held liable
for its wrongful acts.7 9
In addition to the Kitto holding, the case remains significant
for several other reasons as well. The court acknowledged the
injustice that immunity perpetuates and noted that immunity had
"outlived its usefulness as a just instrument of governmental policy."8 0° The court also specified that it recognized a distinction

between governmental and sovereign immunity and that, since it
viewed sovereign immunity as constitutionally mandated, sovereign immunity would not be revoked by the Kitto holding.8 '
However, the court did state that the legislature should consider
abolishing sovereign immunity.82 This request seems to have
fallen on deaf ears, because no legislative action aimed at abolishing sovereign immunity has been taken.83
77. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 796-97 (N.D. 1974). The fence around
the pond had been removed and Mrs. Kitto alleged that the unguarded pond was unsafe
and constituted an attractive nuisance. Id. at 797. Her son was rescued from the pond,
remained in a coma for 20 months, and later died. Id. at 796-97.
78. Id. at 797. The court noted that its holding was consistent with court decisions in
21 other states. Id. at 797 n.2.
79. The court had refused to allow recovery against a governmental agency since Vail
v. Town of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092 (N.D. 1894). See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.
80. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 798. The court adopted a critique from the New Mexico
"
Supreme Court which found it incredible that in today's modern society 'the entire
burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed
upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire
community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship upon
any individual, and where it justly belongs."' Id. (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136
P.2d 480, 482 (N.M. 1943) (emphasis added)).
81. Id. at 801, 804. For a discussion of the difference between governmental and
sovereign immunity, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
82. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 803-04. "The matter of sovereign immunity of the state itself,
which is untouched by this decision, is one on which we would solicit legislative action." Id.
at 803. "Since the sovereign immunity of the state government is not affected by this
decision, legislation to provide a remedy against the state would be an essential subject of
consideration." Id. at 804.
83. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislature's
inaction in the area of sovereign immunity. The last reported case to touch on the issue of
sovereign immunity in North Dakota was Olson v. University of North Dakota, 488 N.W.2d
386 (N.D. 1992). Olson invited the North Dakota Supreme Court to consider the question
of sovereign immunity, but the court declined because the issue of sovereign immunity was
not presented to the trial court. Id. at 388 n.1.
In Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 434 (N.D. 1991), the majority of the court was
not persuaded that past sovereign immunity decisions should be revisited and reaffirmed
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Since Kitto, the North Dakota Supreme Court has heard cases
involving sovereign immunity on numerous occasions, but has consistently held that the state may not be sued without its consent
and that the abrogation of sovereign immunity is a function of the
legislature.8 4
III. TRADITIONAL REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Numerous justifications and public policy arguments have
been advanced to support adherence to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. At first, it was believed that imposing liability on North
Dakota would retard its growth.8 5 The North Dakota Supreme
Court expressed concern over the absence of funds with which to
pay a judgment and worried about the possibility of diverting
funds required for other governmental purposes.8 6 The court
feared that the entry of a judgment against a governmental
agency would force the State to use funds raised for a particular
purpose to pay the judgment, thereby restricting the administration of the government.8 7 Indeed, it appears that the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld sovereign immunity on the belief
that it was more prudent to make isolated individuals suffer than
to inconvenience society.88
their position that the abrogation of sovereign immunity was a matter for the legislature.

Id.
84. Olson, 488 N.W.2d at 388 n.1 (declining to consider question of sovereign
immunity because that issue was not presented to the trial court); Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d
at 434 (stating that article I, section 9 delegates the abrogation of sovereign immunity to the
legislature); Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 259 (N.D. 1990) (refusing to invade the
legislature's domain and abrogate sovereign immunity); Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 910 (N.D. 1988) (holding that since the action did not arise upon
contract it was therefore barred by sovereign immunity); Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d
511, 513-14 (N.D. 1982) (construing article I, section 9 as delegating to the legislature the
State's amenability to suit); Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D.
1982) (construing article I, section 9 as delegating to the legislature the State's amenability
to suit).
85. See Vail v. Town of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092, 1095-96 (N.D. 1894). For a discussion of
Vail see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
86. See State v. Lowe, 210 N.W. 501, 503 (N.D. 1926). The Lowe court surmised that
subjecting North Dakota to suit by its citizens would essentially control "'the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government,"' thus
hampering public service and jeopardizing public safety. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Watland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 225 N.W. 812, 814
(N.D. 1929). The Watland court thought that one of the most obvious reasons for
prohibiting suits against State agencies was that allowing such suits "might result in the
dissipation of a fund raised for a particular purpose by requiring it to be applied in the
liquidation of liabilities in favor of others than those for whose benefit the fund is created."

Id.
88. Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d 738, 742 (N.D. 1968). The Shermoen court
found that governmental immunity had been preserved on three grounds: (1) "The
sovereign is immune from suit ...;"(2) That it is more expedient to make individuals suffer
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The North Dakota Supreme Court maintains that government
functions more efficiently if it is not threatened with tort liability.8 9 This theory is premised on the belief90 that, since sovereign
immunity removes much accident-producing activity from tort
law by preventing an injured plaintiff from suing the state, the
government will grow with the population and will be able to provide the increasing amount of governmental services demanded
by the growing populace. 9 1 In other states, the government has
claimed that its actions constitute a public service "in which it has
no particular interest, and from which it derives no special benefit
or advantage ... but which it is bound to see performed in pursuance of a duty imposed by law for the general welfare" of its citizens.92 Therefore, these states reason that they should not be
financially responsible for private injuries or be subject to the burdens which accompany liability.93
IV. THE PURPORTED CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
A. ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
CONSTITUTION

North Dakota Constitution article I, section 9 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the state in such manner, in such courts,
and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law,
direct.94
than to inconvenience society; (3) That immunity will make government perform more
efficiently. Id.
89. Id.
90. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court maintains that government functions
more efficiently if not threatened with tort liability, see supra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text, the court has never delineated a basis for this theory. Therefore, it is
assumed that the North Dakota Supreme Court relies upon the justifications advanced by
governments of other states in support of this theory.
91. Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 261 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. 1970) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting). Laughner involved a wrongful death action for the death of a minor caused by
the minor's setting herself afire while locked in her room at a county detention home. Id. at
608. Despite the minor's emotional instability and previous suicidal tendencies, an
employee of the detention home provided the minor with matches. Id. The court affirmed
the lower court's dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. A dissenting justice believed
that the case was a "shocking, and harrowing, story of negligence." Id.
92. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Wis. 1962) (quoting Hayes v.
City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 318 (1873)), cited in Shermoen, 163 N.W.2d at 742.
93. Laughner, 261 A.2d at 610.
94. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9

Article I, section 9 was adopted in 1889 by the framers of the
North Dakota Constitution from a Pennsylvania constitutional provision virtually identical in wording.9 5 Pennsylvania drafted its
constitutional provision in 1790, and studies suggest that the framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution did not intend that the entire
Commonwealth would be immune from suit.9" Rather, Pennsylvania courts have determined that this section is neutral and
neither mandates nor forbids sovereign immunity.97 In fact, the
history of Pennsylvania's adoption of this section indicates that
Pennsylvania's constitutional framers intended that the legislature
could decide in which cases the Commonwealth should be
immune, and not that the Commonwealth would be immune.""
There is no indication that Pennsylvania intended to make sovereign immunity the rule. Since North Dakota adopted its proclaimed basis for sovereign immunity from Pennsylvania,9 9 and
since the written records of the debates of North Dakota's First
Constitutional Convention contain no mention of the debate over
the adoption of this section, 00 North Dakota should likewise con95. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 261 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J.,dissenting).
Pennsylvania's constitutional provision after which North Dakota Constitution article I,
section 9 is modeled reads:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought
against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the Legislature may by law direct.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. Pennsylvania article I, section 11 has remained virtually unchanged
since its adoption in 1790. Sloan, supra note 29, at 232. Cf.A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD
FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 482-89 (1968).
The "open courts" clause of both the North Dakota and Pennsylvania constitutional sections
came from similar expressions in the Magna Charta. Id. See also THE MAGNA CHARTA,
supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
96. Sloan, supra note 29, at 210, 219-20 (discussing the history surrounding
Pennsylvania's adoption of article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
97. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 716-17 (Pa. 1978). "[W]e
now believe that this constitutional provision does not forbid judicial abrogation of the
doctrine [of sovereign immunity]." Id. at 716. The Mayle court then quoted with approval
from an earlier dissenting opinion in which Justice Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
said that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not contain an express grant of sovereign
immunity. Id. at 716-17. Justice Nix had earlier pointed out that the Pennsylvania
constitutional provision (from which North Dakota Constitution article I, section 9 was
adopted) merely provided the manner by which Pennsylvania could waive sovereign
immunity if it was ever implemented. Id.
98. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 717. See also Sloan, supra note 29, at 220 (stating that "absent
such a legislative declaration, sovereign immunity or immunity of any kind simply does not
exist.").

99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. Neither a search of the topics of debate nor an examination of the official report of
the proceedings and debates of the first Constitutional Convention of North Dakota
revealed any discussion surrounding the adoption of North Dakota Constitution article I,
section 9.
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sider the historical interpretation Pennsylvania places on this constitutional provision.
C.

THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE

I,

SECTION 9

1. Nine Rules of ConstitutionalInterpretation
The interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution falls

within the realm of the North Dakota Supreme Court.'' When a
constitutional provision is ambiguous, guidelines used to interpret
statutory provisions may be applied to aid in the interpretation of

the constitutional provision in question. 10 2 However, rules used to
interpret statutory and constitutional provisions are often contradictory and a conscious effort should be made to apply rules consistently.103 The following nine rules for constitutional
interpretation have previously been used by the North Dakota
Supreme Court and are particularly applicable to the interpretation of article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution.
10 4
1. The entire document must be examined;
2. If a constitutional provision is subject to two constructions,
one which renders the provision constitutional and the other
which does not, the former construction must be adopted;'

3.

Courts should look at the history of the provision, and

examine the state of the government when the provision was
drafted and adopted so that the prior law, the mischief to be prevented, and the remedy proposed may be ascertained; 10 6
101. State ex rel Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 904 (N.D.1977). See also Ford
Motor Co. v. State, 231 N.W. 883 (N.D.1930). When statutory or constitutional language is
doubtful or ambiguous, the construction placed on the language by the court is entitled to
great weight, and should not be disregarded or overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id. at
888. For a discussion of the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of North Dakota
Constitution article I, section 9, see infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
102. Freed,251 N.W.2d at 908. North Dakota Century Code § 1-02-39 sets forth seven
factors to be considered when construing an ambiguous statute. These seven factors are:
1. The object sought to be attained.
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
3. The legislative history.
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the
same or similar subjects.
5. The consequences of a particular construction.
6. The administrative construction of the statute.
7. The preamble.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
103. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521
(1960). Appendix C lists 45 "Canons of Construction" and many contradict each other. Id.
104. State v. Robinson, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (N.D. 1916).
105. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 324 (N.D. 1986); Patch v. Sebelius,
320 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1982).
106. Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556 (N.D. 1965); Robinson, 160 N.W. at 516.
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4. The intent behind the adoption of the particular constitugiven to interprettional provision must be ascertained and effect
10 7
ing the provision consistent with this intent;
5. The provision must be interpreted from the language of
the provision; if the
language is ambiguous, the field of inquiry
10 8
may be widened;

6. If possible, effect must be given to each provision, section,
and clause contained within the constitutional provision;109
7. Provisions which seem inconsistent must be reconciled if
possible; 10
8. Consult the decisions of other jurisdictions which have
construed similar constitutional provisions;"'
9. When in doubt over interpreting a provision on the basis
which is
of stare decisis, do not allow an interpretation to continue
1
wrong or unsupported by modern considerations. 2
2.

The Conflict Which Creates the Current
Interpretation

The current interpretation of article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution reaches outside the written constitution for
support. The North Dakota Constitution contains no unequivocal
statement which provides that North Dakota shall be immune
from suit; only an inference may be drawn from article I, section 9
in support of this theory. "13 Furthermore, construing article I, section 9 as prohibiting suits against the State requires that the two
The previous state of government may furnish the true meaning of the ambiguous
provision, "and it is especially important to look into [the prior state of law] if the
Constitution is the successor to another," and if substantial changes have been made to the
particular constitutional provision in question. Id. at 516. See supra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text.
107. Robinson, 160 N.W. at 516. See also Newman, 133 N.W.2d at 555. The intent of
the constitutional framers in adopting a constitutional provision should primarily be
deduced from the provision's language. Id.
108. Newman, 133 N.W.2d at 556. See County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371
N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985). If strict adherence to the wording of the provision leads to an
absurd or ludicrous result, the court may then consult extrinsic aids in an effort to properly
construe the provision. Id. at 325.
109. County of Stutsman, 371 N.W.2d at 325. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-1105(23) (1976 & Supp. 1991). Every part of the constitutional provision, no matter how
minuscule, must be considered because "[t]he law neither does nor requires idle acts." Id.
110. Robinson, 160 N.W. at 516. The court "'must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words idle
and nugatory."' Id.
111. Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D. 1988). See, e.g.,
Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 262 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting). "The well
reasoned construction of a like constitutional provision in another state from which ours is
derived is highly persuasive." Id.
112. Robinson, 160 N.W. at 516-17.
113. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. See generally N.D. CONST.
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sentences of section 9 be interpreted as conflicting with each
other. 1 4 This conflict arises because the first sentence of article I,
section 9 provides that "every man for any injury ...

shall have

remedy by due process of law, and right andjustice administered
without sale, denial or delay.""

5

This prime sentence, which

declares that individual rights are above and beyond the power of
the legislature and the State government, guarantees justice to an
injured plaintiff." 1 6 However, the second sentence of article I, section 9 provides that "[s]uitsmay be broughtagainstthe state ...in
such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct."" 7
Thus, when article I, section 9 is construed as prohibiting suits
against the state absent legislative authorization, the second sentence prohibits the remedy guaranteed every person for any
injury which is contained within the first sentence.
The controversy surrounding sovereign immunity stems from
the construction of the second sentence of article I, section 9 of the
North Dakota Constitution. This controversy arises because the
first, primary clause of the second sentence acts as a grant, while
114. See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
115. N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 9. (emphasis added).
116. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 261 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting);
Malin v. La Moure County, 145 N.W. 582,586 (N.D. 1914). In interpreting article I, section
9, the Malin court was "quite satisfied" that this constitutional provision was intended to
guarantee to everyone "reasonable access to the courts and to the privileges accorded by
the courts." Malin, 145 N.W. at 586 (emphasis added). Contra Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387
N.W.2d 716, 723 (N.D. 1986); KFGO Radio, Inc., v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 510-11 (N.D.
1980). Even though the first sentence of article I, section 9 guarantees justice to an injured
plaintiff and declares that an individual's rights are beyond the power of the legislature and
the State government, the North Dakota Supreme Court has construed this entiresentence
as only guaranteeing to the public the right to be physically present at court proceedings.
Andrews, 387 N.W.2d at 723; KFGO Radio, Inc., 298 N.W.2d at 510-11. The court's
interpretation of the first sentence of article I, section 9 supports the clause which states
"All courts shall be open," but ignores and renders ineffective the clause which guarantees
N.D.
that "every man for any injury.., shall have remedy by due process of law.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
In order to give effect to each provision and clause contained within the first sentence
of article I, section 9, see supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text, the first sentence
should be interpreted to both provide the public with physical access to court proceedings
and grant the North Dakota Supreme Court power to render verdicts against the State in
cases in which the State is guilty of tortious conduct.
117. N.D. CONST. art. I,§ 9 (emphasis added). The second sentence of article I, section
9 allows the legislature to direct the course of and regulate the method and manner of
claims brought against the State. See Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d
906, 911 n.6 (N.D. 1988); Schloesser, 458 N.W.2d at 262 (Meschke, J., dissenting). The
legislature may neither completely deny access to our State courts nor bar our State courts
from rendering verdicts against North Dakota. Id. at 262-63. Rather, the second sentence
allows the legislature to procedurally implement the substantive rights granted in the first
sentence, Brown v. Commonwealth, 305 A.2d 868, 876 (Pa. 1973) (Manderino, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa.
1978), by declaring cases in which North Dakota is immune from suit. Sloan, supra note 29,
at 220. However, the power of the legislature to declare cases in which North Dakota is
immune from suit is subject to the North Dakota Supreme Court's laterdetermination that
such a legislative declaration was constitutionally proper. Id.
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the second, subordinate clause acts as a limitation." 8 The first,
granting clause was intended to provide for suits against the state,
while the second, limiting clause was intended to provide a
method by which the legislature could limit suits against the state
should it choose to do so." The distinction is more comprehensible when one understands that the second sentence of section 9
was drafted into the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution at the insistence of a known opponent of sovereign immunity.120 Article I,
section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution is virtually identical in
wording to the Pennsylvania constitutional provision from which it

was adopted.' 2 '

Therefore, when it is understood that the

grant/limitation conflict occurs within the second sentence and

not between the first and the second sentences of article I, section
9, it becomes possible to construe both sentences of this section
consistently with each other, thus giving effect to the whole section and every clause contained within it.' 22 Thus, article I, section 9 should be interpreted: 1) to provide the public with access
to court proceedings; 2) to grant the North Dakota Supreme Court
power to render verdicts against the State in cases in which the
State is guilty of tortious conduct; and, 3) to allow the legislature an
opportunity to declare cases in which the State is immune from
suit.
The North Dakota Supreme Court appears to misconstrue the

proper grant/limitation conflict, and is thus forced to deal with a
constitutional provision which seems to be in conflict with itself.
The court interprets the second sentence of article I, section 9 as a
specific limitation on the first sentence, and concludes that this
limitation entrusts the legislature with the ability to regulate
118. Sloan, supra note 29, at 213-14.
119. Id. at 220. The second "clause meant that the legislature must specifically and
affirmatively declare the cases in equity in which the immunity of the governor or his
officers exists, subject to the high court's determination that any such declared immunity is
constitutionally proper." Id.
120. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 717 (Pa. 1978). The first
sentence was already proposed when James Wilson, an opponent of sovereign immunity,
proposed this second sentence be added: "'Suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth as well as against other bodies corporate and individual.'" Id. (quoting
Francis Shunk, Minutes of the Convention that Formed the Present Constitution of
Pennsylvania 223, 282 (1825)). Wilson's proposed second sentence, which would have
constitutionally abolished sovereign immunity, was already approved by Pennsylvania's
constitutional framers when a motion was made to reconsider and the second sentence was
adopted in its present form. Id. The revised second sentence was adopted over Wilson's
original proposal in order to preserve for the legislature the ability to grant the state
immunity should the legislature desire to do so in certain cases. Id.
121. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for the texts of North Dakota
Constitution article I, section 9 and Pennsylvania Constitution article I, section 11.
122. For a discussion of rules of constitutional interpretation that the North Dakota
Supreme Court utilizes, see supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
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North Dakota's amenability to suit. 12 3 In support of this construction, the court relies on the theory that the North Dakota Constitution is a document of limitations, not of grants.' 2 4 Furthermore,
the court suggests that even if article I, section 9 does not mandate
sovereign immunity, the clear intent of this section is to invest the
legislature with the ability to determine the manner, courts, and
cases in which the state may be sued.12 5 In taking this position, the
court allows the subordinate sentence of article I, section 9 to
dominate the declared rights contained within the entire section,
thereby violating fundamental rules of constitutional interpretation which require inconsistent provisions to be reconciled, and
effect given to each provision, section, and clause contained within
1 26
the constitutional provision.
D.

THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION'S RELIANCE ON
PRECEDENT

The continued adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in North Dakota appears to be based upon precedent. 2 7 This
precedent relies upon previous unintended restrictions that have
been placed upon access to North Dakota's courts.1 28 However,
reliance on precedent should not prevent the North Dakota
Supreme Court from abolishing sovereign immunity; rather, the
123. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 435 (N.D. 1991). The court notes that the
second sentence of North Dakota Constitution article I, section 9 specifically limits the first
sentence by entrusting sovereign immunity to the legislature. Id. This appears to be a
misconstruction because the second sentence does not limit the first sentence; rather, the
second sentence of article I, section 9 supports the first sentence and the limitation occurs
between the two clauses contained within the second sentence. See supra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text.
124. Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1982) (Sand, J.,
concurring specially); State ex rel Agnew v. Schneider, 253 N.W.2d 184, 187 (N.D. 1977). It
must be remembered that the North Dakota Constitution is designed to operate as a
limitation on the government and not as a limitation upon the people. Schloesser v. Larson,
458 N.W.2d 257, 262 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting). Furthermore, although the
North Dakota Constitution is a document of limitations upon the government, the second
sentence of article I, section 9 contains both a grant and a limitation. See supra notes 118-22
and accompanying text.
125. Senger, 320 N.W.2d at 509. This suggestion implies, and the court's refusal to
grant relief against the State demonstrates, that even if sovereign immunity is not
constitutionally mandated, the State is not subject to suit absent the express approval of the
legislature.
126. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
127. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke J., dissenting). See Leadbetter, 467
N.W.2d at 434. The Leadbetter court observed that article I, section 9 "had been
consistently construed as giving the Legislature the power to modify or waive sovereign
immunity." Id. (emphasis added). Schloesser, 458 N.W.2d at 258. "We have consistently
construed [article I, section 9].
Id. (emphasis added). Senger, 320 N.W.2d at 508. "The
construction consistently placed upon [article I, section 9]... " Id. (emphasis added).
128. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.6 (N.D. 1988)
(Meschke, J., concurring). See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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court should "respond[] to the demands of justice" and allow the
law to develop and grow with changing circumstances.1 2 9 For the
law to function properly, precedent must be examined in light of
modern reality and outdated decisions must be abandoned when
the reasons for them no longer exist.' 30 As explained by Justice
Cardozo:
I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by
experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the
sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be
less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment ....
If judges have wofully misinterpreted the mores of their
day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of
ours, they ought not to 13
tie, in helpless submission, the
hands of their successors. '
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously reconsidered
and overruled other established precedents when justice so
required; therefore, it should not hesitate to abolish sovereign
immunity.
E. THE DISPUTE OVER THE POWER TO ABOLISH
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The North Dakota Supreme Court has consistently held that
article I, section 9 vests the legislature with the power to abandon
or modify sovereign immunity, and that absent action by the legislature, the State is not subject to suit. 1 32 In fact, the court has

taken the view that this section vests the legislature with the sole
power to abrogate sovereign
immunity and that the court may not
33
invade this domain.1

The court has opined that the North Dakota Legislature is
fully aware of its (the legislature's) ability to abrogate sovereign
immunity.13 4 In fact, the court has referred to specific Legislative
Reports which it suggests demonstrate the legislature's intent to
129. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 888 (Pa. 1973). In Ayala,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished governmental immunity and recognized that
stare decisis responds to changing times by allowing changes in precedent. Id. at 888-89.
130. Smith v. State, 473 P.2d 937, 943 (Idaho 1970) (determining that because the
reason for sovereign immunity was no longer in existence, the Idaho Supreme Court
abolished sovereign immunity).
131. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150,152 (1921).

132. Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1982); See supra
note 84.
133. Senger, 320 N.W.2d at 510. The court construed article I, section 9 "as a
delegation to the Legislature of the power to regulate the State's amendability to suit and
not as an invitation to the court to invade that domain." Id.

134. Id.
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retain sovereign immunity 1 35 Nevertheless, a review of the Legis-

lative Reports relied on by the court reveals that: (1) much of the
content of the reports is needlessly devoted to tracing the history
of immunity; and (2) that no study has been conducted which

would indicate that the abrogation of sovereign immunity
would
1 36
result in large monetary verdicts against North Dakota.
The abrogation of sovereign immunity is a function well

within the power of the North Dakota Supreme Court and such
action does not appear to violate the separation of powers doctrine. 1 37 While there may be economic consequences for North

Dakota underlying the abolishment of sovereign immunity, the
focus of the court should be on the rights of the individuals whose
claims are barred by sovereign immunity rather than on the effect
which abrogation might have upon the State.' 38 The judiciary is

the proper place for abolishing sovereign immunity while the legislature is the proper place for resolving any problems which may
1 39
be created by the abrogation of this doctrine.
V.

A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9
A.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW USED TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The three standards of North Dakota constitutional review
135. Id. REPORT OF THE N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, GOVERNMENT OFFICER AND
EMPLOYEE LIABILITY STUDY, at 74 (1981); REPORT OF THE N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
MISCELLANEOUS BUDGET SECTION ACTION, at 29 (1979); REPORT OF THE N.D.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, at 173 (1977); REPORT OF THE N.D.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PAYMENT OF CLAIMS, at 83 (1971).

136. See id. The legislature's most in-depth analysis of the abrogation dilemma
occurred in 1981 when it considered two bills related to the personal liability of state
officials. REPORT OF THE N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, at 75 (1981). The proposed bills

were opposed by a group of attorneys general who believed the major problem was the cost
of defending lawsuits brought against state officials. Id. However, no study or facts were
presented to establish that the beliefs of the attorneys general were meritorious. Id.
137. See Haugland v. Meier, 335 N.W.2d 809, 811 (N.D. 1983). The North Dakota
Supreme Court is not bound by the legislature's interpretation of the North Dakota
Constitution and a question of law as to the constitutionality of sovereign immunity vests no
discretion in the legislature. Id. The Haugland court reviewed the Secretary of State's
interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution as it pertained to changing the name of a
State college. Id. at 810-11. The court "concluded that [they] were not bound by the
secretary of state's interpretation of the constitution and that a question of law as to the
sufficiency of the petition vests no discretion in the secretary." Id. at 811.
138. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.w.2d 431, 437-38 (N.D. 1991) (Meschke, J., dissenting);
Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986).
139. See Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.6 (N.D. 1988)
(Meschke, J., dissenting). Justice Meschke notes that "the legislature may 'direct' the course
of claims against the State," but that citizens are entitled to their constitutional rights. Id.
It is the court's responsibility to protect citizens constitutional rights; therefore, it is the
court's responsibility to abolish sovereign immunity.
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applicable when a plaintiff challenges a constitutional provision on
equal protection grounds are strict scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny,
and intermediate scrutiny. 140 Strict scrutiny is a heightened level
of scrutiny applied to classifications of "fundamental interest" or to
classes that are "inherently suspect.'

14 1

A challenged classification

will fail strict scrutiny unless it is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest. 42 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has held "that the right to recover for personal injuries is
not a fundamental right;"'1

43

thus, strict scrutiny may not be used

to review the constitutionality of sovereign immunity because
claims involving sovereign immunity challenge neither a funda44
mental interest nor an inherently suspect classification.'
At the other end of the spectrum is rational basis scrutiny.
Rational basis scrutiny is the easiest standard of review to satisfy
and is applied when nonsuspect classifications which do not interfere with fundamental or important substantive rights are
involved.' 45 A contested classification will survive review "'unless
it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.' "146 Rational basis scrutiny is usually
applied to classifications dealing with economic and social matters;
however, the court does not consider human life and safety as
140. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 324 (N.D. 1986). The North Dakota
Supreme Court's review of constitutional questions "is different from the review by the
United States Supreme Court," particularly in the area of State legislation. Johnson v.
Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974).
141. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974). The Johnson court
considered the constitutionality of the North Dakota Guest Law, which allowed a passenger
riding in another's automobile to recover for injuries caused by the ordinary negligence of
the operator if the passenger paid for the transportation, but not if they didn't pay. Id. at
777. The court applied the intermediate standard of review and found that the guest law
did not operate uniformly because it provided "a special immunity from liability for
ordinary negligence to a special category of persons," (the immunity given drivers of
automobiles who negligently injured their nonpaying passengers) while it allowed a
passenger to recover for the same ordinary negligence of the driver if the passenger paid
for the transportation. Id. at 780. The court further found that the classification was
"unreasonable for any proper purpose of legislation and [was] not based upon justifiable
distinctions concerning any proper purpose of the law, and that it (was] arbitrary and
overinclusive." Id.
142. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D. 1991).
143. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 323 n.9. The right of a tort victim to recover for personal
injuries is an important substantive right. Id. at 325. The Hanson court considered
whether a 10-year statute of limitations for products liability claims violated the North
Dakota Constitution. Id. at 320. The court noted its concern regarding "statutes which
arbitrarily deny one class of persons important substantive rights to life and safety which
are available to other persons," and concluded the 10-year statute of limitations violated
article I, section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 328.
144. See id. at 323. "Inherently suspect classifications include classifications based
upon race, sex, national origin, illegitimacy, or other immutable characteristics determined
solely by accident of birth." Id. at 334 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting).
145. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 436 .(citing Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219
(N.D. 1989)).
146. Id. (quoting Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1989)).
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merely a matter of economics. 47 Rather, the right to recover for
148
personal injuries is viewed as an important substantive right.
A third, intermediate level of review may be used by the
court when neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis scrutiny apply.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that intermediate level review is appropriate when "an important substantive
right" is at issue. 149 This intermediate level of constitutional
review "requires 'a close correspondence between the [constitutional] classification and legislative goals.' "150 Therefore, an arbitrary distinction between two classes of individuals must be
justified by underlying legislative purposes or the classification is
unconstitutional. '5 1
The intermediate level of review should be used to determine
the constitutionality of sovereign immunity. The North Dakota
Supreme Court has determined that the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right 52 and that the
intermediate level of review should be applied when an important
substantive right is at issue.' 5 3 The court has applied the intermediate standard of review when considering tort claims brought by
plaintiffs against private tortfeasors.15 4 In addition, the court has
determined that the intermediate level of review is the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing "the classification of tort
victims of insured state agencies and tort victims of non-insured
state agencies."155 Therefore, the court should apply the interme147. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
148. Id. at 325. See also Leadbetter,467 N.W.2d at 436. While there may be economic
consequences for the State underlying the abolishment of North Dakota Constitution article
I, section 9, the focus should be on the rights of the individuals whose claims are barred by
sovereign immunity rather than on the effect upon the State. Id. at 438 (Meschke, J.,
dissenting); Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
149. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
150. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D.1978). For a discussion of the
discriminatory classification created by the court's current interpretation of article I, section
9, see infra notes 157-85 and accompanying text.
151. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 324; Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974).
The traditional reasons for sovereign immunity suggest that the required close fit between
the arbitrary distinction and constitutional framers' underlying legislative purpose is nonexistent. See supra notes 85-93 & infra notes 164-81 and accompanying text.
152. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325. In Hanson, the court stated that it was "'unwilling to
view human life and safety as simply a matter of economics." Id. Furthermore, the court
noted that its "focus must be on the individuals affected" by the legislation and not on the
economic consequences which may result from the court's decision. Id.
153. Id.
154. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979). The intermediate level
of scrutiny was applied in an action against a private tortfeasor and a municipality for
injuries sustained as a result of the private tortfeasor's negligent driving. Id. at 446, 451.
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974). The intermediate level of scrutiny
was applied in an action against a private tortfeasor for injuries sustained as a result of the
private tortfeasor's negligent driving. Id. at 772, 780.
155. Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1982) (emphasis added).
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diate standard of review and determine that the classification15 6
which sovereign immunity imposes upon the class of injured people is unconstitutional.
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION: THE DISCRIMINATORY
CLASSIFICATION CREATED BY THE CURRENT
INTERPRETATION

As currently interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, article I, section 9 creates an impermissible invidious classification among the class of injured people. The court's interpretation of article I, section 9 arbitrarily splits the class of people
injured by the negligent acts of another into two disparate subclasses: (1) people injured by private tortfeasors who may recover
for their injury; and (2) people injured by the State's tortious conduct or by the actions of State employees who may not recover for
their injuries. 157 This classification violates North Dakota's constitutional provision which provides for equal protection' 5 because
the privilege of receiving compensation for a wrong inflicted upon
a plaintiff depends on whether the tortfeasor is a private party or
whether the tortfeasor is the State or a State agency or
employee.' 5 9 In other words, the immunity from suit granted the
tortfeasor is dependent upon whether the tortfeasor is a private
party or whether the tortfeasor is the State or a State agency or
employee. 60 A plaintiff may maintain an action against a private
tortfeasor and recover damages because a private tortfeasor is not

156. See infra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the classification
created by the current interpretation of article 1, section 9 of the North Dakota
Constitution.
157. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 452 (N.D. 1979) (citing Reich v. State
Highway Dept., 194 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 1972)). Reich involved a consolidation of three
personal injury claims brought against the Michigan State Highway Department. Reich,
194 N.W.2d at 701. Reich challenged a notice provision that served to bar claims against
Michigan if notice of a claim was not given within 60 days of the injury. Id. The Reich
court held that the notice provision "arbitrarily split the natural class, i.e., all tortfeasors,
into two differently treated subclasses: private tortfeasors to whom no notice of claim is
owed and governmental tortfeasors to whom notice is owed," and declared that such
arbitrary treatment violated equal protection guarantees. Id. at 702.
158. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke
J., concurring). "Sovereign immunity... is contrary to our constitutions." Id. See Hanson
v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 332 & n.3, 333 (N.D. 1986). Article I, section 21 of the
North Dakota Constitution guarantees equal protection, and provides in relevant part that
no "citizen or class of citizens [shall] be granted privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." Id. at 332 n.3; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution also guarantees equal
protection and provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
Xiv, § 1.
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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However, because of sovereign immunity,

the State and State agencies and employees are immune from suit
62
and a plaintiff may not recover damages from these tortfeasors.1
In a case involving a similar invidious classification, the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that such a classification was unreasonable, arbitrary and overinclusive,
and unsupported by any
63
proper legislative justification.
The intermediate standard of review "requires 'a close correspondence between the [constitutional] classification and legislative goals.' 1164 However, the arbitrary and invidious
classification

165

created by sovereign immunity is not justified by

the purposes advanced in support of adherence to this doctrine.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has expressed concern over the
potential absence of funds with which to pay a judgment and over
the possible fiscal inconvenience which might accompany the abolition of sovereign immunity. 16 6 The court has also asserted that
State government functions more efficiently if it is not threatened
with tort liability.' 6 7 Other state agencies and employees have

claimed that the abrogation of sovereign immunity would subject
161. See generally Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974) (allowing a plaintiff
injured in an automobile accident to recover damages from the private tortfeasor driver).
162. See generally Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1991). "When an action
is essentially against the state to recover money, the state is the real party in interest and is
entitled to invoke sovereign immunity even though it is not a named defendant." Id. at 432.
Furthermore, since a "[s]tate agency" is an "institution of state government," N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12.1-02(6) (Supp. 1991), and since a suit against a State employee for acts done in
their official capacity "is tantamount to suing the State itself," Kristensen v. Strinden, 343
N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D. 1983), an injured plaintiff cannot circumvent the State's sovereign
immunity by suing the state agency or the State employee that was involved in the tortious
action. Thus, "(tihe injustices of state immunity remain for one who is injured by the
wrongful act of the state government," Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 803
(N.D. 1974) and the result is that the State saves a "fiscal inconvenience through injustice to
individuals." Leadbetter,467 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
163. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974). The Johnson court
considered the constitutionality of the North Dakota Guest Law, which allowed a passenger
riding in another's automobile to recover for injuries caused by the ordinary negligence of
the operator if the passenger paid for the transportation, but not if they didn't pay. Id. at
777. The court applied the intermediate standard of review and found that the guest law
did not operate uniformly because it provided "a special immunity from liability for
ordinary negligence to a special category of persons," (the immunity given drivers of
automobiles who negligently injured their nonpaying passengers) while it allowed a
passenger to recover for the same ordinary negligence of the driver if the passenger paid
for the transportation. Id. at 780. The court further found that the classification was
"unreasonable for any proper purpose of legislation and [was] not based upon justifiable
distinctions concerning any proper purpose of the law, and that it [was] arbitrary and
overinclusive." Id.
164. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the classification
created by the current interpretation of article I, section 9 of the North Dakota
Constitution.
166. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the North Dakota
Supreme Court's concern about subjecting North Dakota to a fiscal inconvenience.
167. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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North Dakota to a sudden influx of litigation and liability for large
monetary verdicts.' 68 Finally, the court has continuously relied
upon its past interpretations of article I, section 9 and determined
that this precedent mandates continued adherence to sovereign
immunity absent legislative action.' 69 However, these justifications are not valid reasons for continuing to adhere to sovereign
immunity since there are alternative methods which both protect
the State's interests and provide a remedy for people injured by
the State's tortious conduct.
The North Dakota Supreme Court's concern over the lack of
funds with which to pay a judgment and over the fiscal inconvenience which might accompany the abrogation of sovereign immunity are not legitimate concerns since the legislature has already
provided a means by which state agencies may protect themselves
against monetary judgments. 17 0 Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that North Dakota agencies and employees function more efficiently if not exposed to tort liability.' 7 ' Rather, state
agencies and employees would become more efficient if North
Dakota could be held liable for the tortious acts of its agencies and
employees.' 7 2 There is also no evidence to suggest that North
Dakota would be subjected to a sudden influx of litigation or that
large monetary verdicts against the State would result if sovereign
168. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169. See Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 434 (N.D. 1991). The Leadbetter court
observed that article I, section 9 "had been consistently construed as giving the Legislature
the power to modify or waive sovereign immunity." Id. (emphasis added). Schloesser v.
Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 258 (N.D. 1990). "We have consistently construed [article I,
section 9] ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320
N.W.2d 507, 508 (N.D. 1982). "The construction consistently placed upon [article I, section
9] .... " Id. (emphasis added).
170. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(1) (Supp. 1991). North Dakota Century Code
Section 32-12.1-15(1) allows state agencies to purchase insurance or to join an insurance
pool. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(1) (Supp. 1991). In addition, North Dakota Century
Code Section 32-12.1-03(2) establishes an award ceiling and eliminates the award of
punitive or exemplary damages against political subdivisions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.103(2) (Supp. 1991). A statute similar to North Dakota Century Code section 32-12.1-03(2)
could be enacted by the Legislature for the protection of state agencies.
171. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
172. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4,

at 25 (5th ed. 1984). The North Dakota Supreme Court appears to maintain that since
sovereign immunity prevents North Dakota from being sued for its tortious actions, the
government will become more efficient because it will grow with the population and will be
able to increase the amount of services which it provides to the public. See supra notes 8991 and accompanying text. However, if North Dakota was liable for the tortious conduct of
its agencies and employees, "there [would be] a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence
of the harm." KEETON ET AL., supra, § 4, at 25. Thus, it would seem that if North Dakota
were liable for the tortious conduct of its agencies and employees, North Dakota
government could become more efficient and the tortious conduct of state agencies and
employees would be lessened because the possibility of liability would provide an
"incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm." Id.
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immunity were abolished. 173 The prospective abolition of sovereign immunity' 74 would prevent North Dakota from being held
liable for the tortious actions of State agencies or employees which
occurred before the date of abolition and would also allow State
agencies time to procure insurance coverage or time to join an
insurance pool.' 7 5 Finally, reliance upon precedent

76

does not

constitute a legitimate reason for continuing to adhere to sovereign immunity because doing so may "threaten the stability and
predictability of the law.' 1 77 In fact, frank refusal "to abandon a
rule of law which has not withstood critical scrutiny or which has
been rendered anachronistic by the passage of time and events
may itself breed uncertainty in the law" and give rise to "casuistic
distinctions" 78which are "impossible to apply with any
consistency." '
7 9
The above discussion demonstrates that the classification1
173. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Local governmental agencies such as
counties, townships, park districts, school districts and cities have been subject to liability
for the tortious actions of their agencies and employees since Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224
N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kitto, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying
text. If local government entities can withstand being liable for the tortious acts of local
agencies and employees, North Dakota should also be able to withstand being liable for the
tortious acts of State agencies and employees. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether
retrospective or prospective abrogation of sovereign immunity would best serve the needs
of North Dakota while still providing an injured party with a means of redress against the
State.
175. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits of
prospectively abolishing sovereign immunity. North Dakota Century Code § 32-12.1-15(1)
allows State agencies to purchase insurance or to join an insurance pool "for [their] own
protection or for the protection of any state employee." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(1)
(Supp. 1991).
176. See supra notes 127-31 & infra note 213 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how the North Dakota Supreme Court relies on precedent to perpetuate the continued
adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
177. Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 261 A.2d 607, 611 (Pa. 1970) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting).
178. Id. As noted by Justice Cardozo:
There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the
rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the
conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product of
institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or development
with the progress of the years. In such circumstances.... [the] 'court best serves
the law [when it] recognizes that rules of law which grew up in a remote
generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another
generation badly, and [when it] discards the old rule [upon a finding that a more
modem] rule of law represents what should be according to the established and
settled judgment of society .... Change of this character should not be left to
the legislature.'
CARDOZO, supra note 131, at 151-52 (quoting Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 92 A. 883, 891
(Conn. 1915)).
179. See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the invidious
classification created by the current interpretation of article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution.
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created by sovereign immunity is not justified by the objectives 8 0
sought to be achieved through the continued adherence to this
doctrine. Therefore, since the intermediate standard of review
requires a close correspondence between the arbitrary classification and the government's objectives,'
the unreasonable and
arbitrary classification that article I, section 9 imposes upon the
class of injured people is unconstitutional and in violation of the
equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution if the
intermediate standard of review is applied.
C. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 9 VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

The invidious classification created by the court's current
interpretation of article I, section 9182 also violates the due process
provisions of the North Dakota and Federal Constitutions because
a plaintiff who is injured by the State is deprived of property without the due process of law. 18 3 The North Dakota Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the majority of authorities view a personal
injury claim as a form of property.'8 4 However, a plaintiff who is
injured by tortious state conduct is denied any chance of recovering for their injuries because of the status of the tortfeasor.18 5
Therefore, since sovereign immunity prevents a plaintiff who is
injured by tortious state conduct from pursuing a personal injury
180. For a discussion of the purposes and goals sought to be achieved by adhering to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the invidious
classification created by the current interpretation of article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution.
183. See Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 (N.D. 1988)
(Meschke, J., concurring). Due process guarantees are contained in article I, section 12 of
the North Dakota Constitution which provides that "[no person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12. In addition,
article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution is interwoven with due process
protections. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 333.
Due process guarantees are also contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution which provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. Strankowski v. Strankowski, 447 N.W.2d 323, 326 (N.D. 1989). In Strankowski,
the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a lien on the contingent proceeds of a personal
injury action as security for future child support payments and stated that "the majority of
authorities conclude that a cause of action for a personal injury is a chose in action which is a
form of property." Id. By imposing a lien on the contingent proceeds of the personal injury
action, the court impliedly adopted the rule followed by the majority of authorities which
treats a personal injury claim as a property right. Id.
185. Leadbetter,467 N.W.2d at 432. When a plaintiff brings an action against the State
to recover money, the State is entitled to invoke sovereign immunity. Id. Thus, when the
tortfeasoris the State, the plaintiff is denied recovery for their injuries and the State saves a
"fiscal inconvenience through injustice to individuals." Id. at 438 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
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claim against the State, one could argue that the plaintiff is

deprived of property without the due process of law.
VI. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS RELATED TO THE
ABOLITION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A.

RETROSPECTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE ABOLITION

Once the decision is made to abolish sovereign immunity, the
problem of prospective or retrospective abolition surfaces. The
prospective/retrospective decision must be made with care so that
confusion and injustice is minimized for those who have relied on
pre-abolition decisions. 1 86 On one side, prospective abrogation is
unfair to a person injured before the date on which abrogation
takes effect. 18 7 On the other side, retrospective abrogation is
unfair because North Dakota would be denied a defense "which
was in existence at the time the underlying cause of action
arose."' 8 8 Therefore, the best solution is the application of the
Sunburst Doctrine,' 8 9 which would allow the North Dakota
Supreme Court to choose between prospective and retrospective
abolition. If the court were to choose prospective abolition, sovereign immunity would be abolished with respect to the parties of
the particular case then before the court, while providing for general abrogation to begin at some future date.
The prospective abolishment of sovereign immunity would
parallel the judicial abolishment of governmental immunity by
Kitto v. Minot Park District,while providing three valuable adjustment periods.' 90 First, prospective abrogation provides the court
with flexibility in dealing with future liability issues not presented
by the parties to the abolishing action.' 9 ' Second, prospective
186. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 803-04 (N.D. 1974). The Kitto court
discussed the rationale behind the prospective abrogation of governmental immunity. Id.
The same rationale would apply to the abolishment of sovereign immunity.
187. KEETON ET AL., supra note 172, § 131, at 1055 n.43 (5th ed. 1984).
188. Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975). Nieting involved a
personal injury action in which the plaintiff alleged that the Minnesota State Highway
Department was negligent in its design, construction and maintenance of highway barriers.
Id. at 599. The court prospectively abolished sovereign immunity so that the legislature
would have time to work out the procedural details. Id. at 603.
189. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). The Great Northern
Railway had been transporting oil for Sunburst and charging Sunburst based on an
estimated weight per pound. Id. at 359-60. Sunburst learned that it was being overcharged
and brought suit to recover for past overcharges. Id. at 359. The court held that when
deviating from precedent, a court may choose "for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court,
though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions." Id. at 364.
190. See Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 804.
191. Id.
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abrogation gives governmental entities which have relied on the
immunity time to procure insurance coverage. 192 Finally, prospective abrogation gives the legislature an opportunity to declare
in what instances the State is immune from suit-a power given
the legislature in the second sentence of article I, section 9 of the
1 93
North Dakota Constitution.
B.

OTHER PROBLEMS RELATED TO ABOLITION

There are other potential problems related to the abolition of
sovereign immunity. Confusion and a sudden influx of litigation
against North Dakota may accompany the abolition of this doctrine. However, if local government entities can withstand being
subject to suit, the State should also be able to withstand the
potential liability. 1 9 4 In addition, the ability of the State to obtain
adequate insurance and excessive damage awards against the State
are likely to be concerns that will surface immediately upon abrogation. 1 9 5 However, these problems are not without a solution,
and legislative action after abrogation would effectively serve to
protect the State's interest in guarding itself against frivolous
litigation.
The legislature has numerous options available for dealing
with these potential problems. Upon abrogation, the legislature
could establish a special claims court for hearing suits against
North Dakota, it could require prompt notice of a claim against
the State when a cause of action has arisen, and/or it could shorten
6
the statute of limitations for bringing an action against the State. 19
In addition, the legislature could establish damage ceilings,
require State agencies to purchase insurance, and statutorily eliminate punitive or exemplary damage awards to an injured party.' 97
192. Id.
193. For a discussion of the legislature's ability to declare the State immune from suit,
see supra notes 117 & 119 and accompanying text.
194. Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. 1972). The Campbell court
abolished sovereign immunity and noted that "[i]f city and county governments can
withstand the consequences of such liability, where the traffic hazards seemingly are
greater, the state should be able to also bear such burden." Id.
195. Id.
196. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 803 n.18. Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-22.1 (1991).
Currently, North Dakota Century Code § 28-01-22.1 provides a three-year statute of
limitations for bringing claims against "the state or its employees and officials acting within
the scope of their employment or office." Id.
197. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15(1) (Supp. 1991). Currently, North Dakota
Century Code § 32-12.1-15(1) allows state agencies to purchase insurance or to join an
insurance pool. Id. In addition, North Dakota Century Code § 32-12.1-03(2) establishes an
award ceiling and eliminates the award of punitive or exemplary damages against political
subdivisions. Id. § 32-12.1-03(2). Similar statutes could be enacted by the Legislature for
the protection of the State.
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If the legislature followed these guidelines, North Dakota would
not be jeopardized by excessive litigation or large damage awards,
and an innocent victim of tortious state conduct would be provided a remedy for the wrong inflicted upon him or her.
VII.

MOVING TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
A.

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT

The 1992 election may have changed the makeup of the
North Dakota Supreme Court enough to provide for the abolition
of sovereign immunity when the next case challenging the doctrine is presented to the court. 19 8 In previous cases in which a
party challenged the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Justices
Erickstad, Vande Walle, and Gierke voted as a majority of the
court and upheld this doctrine. 19 9 Two other justices, Justices
Meschke and Levine, consistently voted in favor of abolishing sovereign immunity.2 0 However, the 1992 election replaced Justices
Erickstad and Gierke and may have thus provided the impetus for
the abolition of this outmoded doctrine. Justice Gierke's former
position was filled by the election of Dale Sandstrom to a four year
term,2 1 and William Neumann was elected to fill the vacancy created by Chief Justice Erickstad's retirement. 20 2 Justice Vande
198. At the time this article was written, a case challenging the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr.
Co., Civ. No. 930007 (on file with the Clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court). Bulman
involves a wrongful death action which results from a vehicle accident that occurred at the
site of a road construction project. Brief for Appellants at 3, Bulman, Civ. No. 930007. The
district court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim
was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the appeal now before the North
Dakota Supreme Court followed. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court heard arguments
in this case on April 15, 1993 and it is anticipated that the court will render a decision
within the following few months.
199. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1991); Schloesser v. Larson, 458
N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1990); Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist.v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 1988).
200. Leadbetter,467 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke and Levine, JJ., dissenting) "[S]overeign
immunity is textually unfounded, lacks historical accuracy, and is judicially irrational." Id.
Schloesser, 458 N.W.2d at 262 (Meschke and Levine, JJ., dissenting) "[The] sovereign
immunity of the State and its officials should be discarded as unconstitutional." Id. In a
third case involving sovereign immunity, Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 906, Justice Meschke
voted with the majority for substantive reasons,id. at 912, but severely criticized sovereign
immunity and called for its abrogation. Id. at 911.
201. Decision 92: N.D. Supreme Court, THE GRAND FORKS HERALD, Nov. 4, 1992, at
C5. Supreme court justices serve for ten-year terms. N.D. CONST. art VI, § 7. Justice
Gierke had resigned effective November 20, 1991 in order to accept an appointment to the
United States Court of Military Appeals. Musich v. Yagow, 478 N.W.2d 15, 17 (N.D. 1991).
There were four years remaining in Justice Gierke's term. Carter Wood, Negative Politics
Enters the Judicial Campaign, THE GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al.
202. Decision 92: N.D. Supreme Court, supra note 207, at C5. William Neumann
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Walle was chosen the new Chief Justice. °3 Since two former justices who voted in favor of upholding sovereign immunity are no
longer on the bench, the tide of votes may turn.
B. THE NUMBER OF VOTES REQUIRED TO ABOLISH THE
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The North Dakota Supreme Court is made up of five justices 20 4 and a majority vote of the court is necessary to pronounce
a decision.20 5 However, the court "shall not declare a legislative
enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the members of
20 6
the court so decide.-

Article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution was
intended to provide a means by which the legislature could, if it
desired, declare cases in which North Dakota would be immune
from suit. 20 7

However, this legislative power is subject to the

North Dakota Supreme Court'sdetermination that such a legislative declaration is constitutionally proper.208 Absent such a legislative declaration, sovereign immunity does not exist in North
Dakota.
The North Dakota Constitution contains no unequivocal statement which provides that North Dakota shall be immune from
suit. 20 9 Furthermore, the legislature has never established sover-

eign immunity in North Dakota. In fact, the closest the legislature
has ever come to establishing sovereign immunity occurs in North
Dakota Century Code section 32-12.1-03(4). Section 32-12.1-03(4)
is part of a chapter which is entitled and pertains to the "Liability
of PoliticalSubdivisions. '2 1° This section provides that "[tihe sov-

ereign immunity of the state is not waived in any manner by this
challenged Bob Wefald in the race for a ten-year term created by the retirement of Chief

Justice Erickstad. Negative PoliticsEnters the judicial Campaign, supra note 207, at Al.
203. Dale Wetzel, VandeWalle Chosen ChiefJustice of Supreme Court, THE GRAND
FORKS HERALD, Dec. 5, 1992, at A8. It is interesting to note that Justice Vande Walle was
an assistant attorney general who wrote the amicus curiae brief on behalf of the State in
Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1974). It is also interesting to note that
in Kitto, Justice Meschke was the attorney for the plaintiff. See Amicus Curiae Brief of
Attorney General (the brief's cover), Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974)
(No. 9030) (on file in the Thormodsgard Law Library at the University of North Dakota).
For a discussion of Kitto, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
204. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
205. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
206. Id.
207. Sloan, supra note 29, at 220. See also supra notes 117 & 119 and accompanying
text.
208. Sloan, supra note 29, at 220. See also supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
209. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. See generally N.D. CONST. See supra notes 56-66 and
accompanying text.
210. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 32-12.1 (Supp. 1991).
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chapter, and this chapter shall not be construed to abrogate the
immunity of the state. '211 However, since the North Dakota Constitution does not establish sovereign immunity,2 1 2 and since the
legislature has never provided for sovereign immunity in North
Dakota, the sovereign immunity to which section 32-12.1-03(4)
refers results from precedents which have been applied as "an
unexpressed and unintended limitation on access to the courts of
this state. '21 3 Therefore, since the judicial abrogation of sovereign
immunity would require the overruling of a precedent ratherthan
a determination that a legislative enactment was unconstitutional,
the votes of only three justices are needed to abolish this
doctrine. 14
VIII. CONCLUSION
Today, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is in disfavor, and
"courts are disposed to hear an action against the state unless good
reason stands in the way. ' ' 21 5 The legislature has already given
state agencies permission to obtain insurance coverage 216 and has
thus negated the possibility that a verdict against North Dakota
would have a detrimental impact on State finances. Nevertheless,
the North Dakota Supreme Court continues to uphold the doctrine, and in doing so reaches outside the written constitution and
the laws of the State, thereby denying a wronged person's otherwise valid, legitimate claim against a State entity. 1
Sovereign immunity places the burden resulting from the tortious acts of the State upon a single individual rather than on the
entire community of North Dakota where it belongs. 218 This
approach seems contrary to public policy because people injured
211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(4) (Supp. 1991).
212. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. See generally N.D. CONST. See also supra notes 56-66 &
117 and accompanying text.
213. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.6 (N.D. 1988)
(Meschke, J., dissenting). See notes 53-66 and accompanying text. Article I, section 9
contains no unequivocal statement which grants North Dakota sovereign immunity. See
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. Therefore, if the North Dakota Supreme Court were to abolish
sovereign immunity, it would be overturning its interpretation of North Dakota
Constitution article I, section 9. See Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 258 (N.D. 1990).
"We have consistently construed [article I, section 9] .. ." Id. (emphasis added). Senger v.
Huistrand Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 508 (N.D. 1982). "The construction consistently
placed upon [article I, section 9] .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
214. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
215. 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Etc. § 101 (1974).
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15 (Supp. 1991).
217. See Brief for Third Party Defendants-Appellees at 11, Schloesser v. Larson, 458
N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890202) (on file in the Thormodsgard Law Library at the
University of North Dakota).
218. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136 P.2d 480, 482
(N.M. 1943)).
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by the State do not receive "a full measure of relief from wrongs
inflicted upon them. '219 Furthermore, in a democracy that
encourages the resolution of issues of broad public interest 220 and
which protects individual rights, the court should not neglect the
resolution of private injustices inflicted by State entities. 221 To
properly serve the public interest, North Dakota must strive to
protect its citizens and provide them with remedies for wrongs
inflicted upon them. If the State fails in this task, it will be operating in conflict with public policy, public interest, and the public
22 2
good.
The North Dakota Supreme Court should not unduly regard
potential problems associated with the abrogation of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Rather, it should be remembered that the
judiciary is the proper place for abolishing sovereign immunity,
while the legislature is the proper place for resolving any
problems created by the abrogation of this doctrine.223 If the legislature acts promptly after sovereign immunity is abolished, and
establishes safeguards to protect North Dakota against frivolous litigation and outrageous verdicts, wrongfully injured individuals
will be provided a remedy and the interests of the State will
remain protected.
The time has come for the North Dakota Supreme Court to
declare liability the rule and immunity the exception when dealing with tortious claims against the State. 24 New causes of action
should not be created, but existing causes of action should be
allowed to be pursued. The time has come for the North Dakota
Supreme Court to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
William R. Hartl

219. Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 70 (N.D. 1983).
220. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 804.
221. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 263 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting).
222. Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975).
223. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 n.6 (N.D. 1988)
(Meschke J., dissenting). Justice Meschke states that "the legislature may 'direct' the course
of claims against the State," but that citizens are entitled to their constitutional rights. Id.
It is the court's responsibility to protect citizens' constitutional rights; therefore, it is the
court's responsibility to abolish sovereign immunity.
224. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962).

